

National Trends

The Immaturity of J. W. Fulbright

FORREST DAVIS

The man to watch in Washington these days, as the Atlantic powers drift disjointedly toward Khrushchev's Summit, is Senator J. William Fulbright, an oracular, humorless, intensely ambitious statesman from the river flats of Arkansas by way of Oxford University's storied halls. Fulbright intends to use his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee to rescue United States foreign policy from its "inadequacy" and help the American people, all too few of them beneficiaries of Cecil Rhodes' scholarship trust, "to grow up—to become more mature, more sophisticated, humble, subtle and wise."

In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors' annual meeting in Washington, wherein Fulbright announced his large intentions, he ceded to the President "day-by-day policy-making" in situations "like that in Berlin." Not so with the fundamentals. Fulbright added:

"The Senate, however, is very well equipped to deal with the longer-range, more basic questions" of foreign policy. "It is to these questions that I intend to devote most of my attention as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee."

Fulbright's discourse to the editors contained the usual Aesopian double-speak of the cautious Flexible. It was hard to sift meanings from the lofty verbiage, but what the Senator seemed to be saying was that the American people—although they and not the responsible persons in Washington govern "our incredibly complicated and fragmented decision-making process"—are plainly incompetent. Too immature and unsophisticated, too prone to divert "steel into automobile fin tails" instead of school construction. Too unwise to share Fulbright's view that the greatest challenge to their well-being, peace and survival is not the military might of a Communist empire obsessively vowed to their destruction but a "psychological problem within ourselves."

We must look elsewhere to find

Fulbright's prescriptions. To his emphasis on munificent donations (\$1.5 billion a year for five years) to backward economies irrespective of United States and Free World interest, ahead of military assistance.

The Fulbright thesis that the United States government overemphasizes its military rejoinder to Soviet arrogance is the favorite current cliché of the Liberal Establishment. A thesis that likewise finds favor in a Moscow poised to strike at a half dozen points through its satellites. One hears the new isolationism propounded all about. Adlai E. Stevenson advances it repetitiously. The principal objection of the Establishment to foreign assistance is that so much of it goes to firm the military muscle of the free Chinese, the free Koreans, the Indochinese, the Turks *et alia*, and not enough for power plants on obscure Asian rivers. The point here is that Soviet Russia may arm its dependencies for war on the marches of empire, not the United States.

We find another Fulbright prescription in his demand that the United States recognize Red China. Another in his proposal that we foregather with Nikita S. Khrushchev genially and often, a proposal that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan has echoed and which evokes only disdain from statesmen who have most experienced the futility of negotiating with the Bolsheviks—Truman, Dulles and Acheson among them.

The Fulbright prescriptions could be ingenuous. If you grant that Fulbright understands the dynamics of the Soviet push for world dominion, if he has grasped the history of Soviet Russia's dealings with its intended victims, one is tempted to call his conclusions and the formulas built on them immature, if not unsophisticated. If he merely seeks a party advantage by suggesting a new departure—and Fulbright has shown himself narrow if not spitefully partisan in his treatment of Clare Boothe Luce

and Ogden Reid Jr., and his refusal to agree to a congressional medal for Mr. Dulles without a quid quo pro—then he is reckless. The Dulles incident is illuminating. Senator Everett M. Dirksen, minority leader, asked Fulbright's approval for such a medal, Congress' way of saying "well done" to exemplary public servants. But Fulbright declined to go along unless at the same time a medal was struck for Mr. Acheson, who may or may not have earned the grateful regard of the Congress but who, in any case, has not run his course and presumably, being in his prime, looks to new laurels.

The danger posed by Fulbright's view of our destiny is that he has a will to prevail during the remainder of the Eisenhower Administration and, more confidently, after 1960.


There is more. A recent article in the *Washington Post* by the diligent and authoritative commentator on foreign affairs, Chalmers Roberts, declared that we were entering a new era in our Cold War relationships, an era when the reins of policy would be held by Fulbright, Herter and Vice President Richard M. Nixon.

Chalmers Roberts enjoys the confidence of the Establishment and publishes its doctrines. Referring to Fulbright's enigmatic address before the editors and some remarks of Nixon's before the same group that could be taken as nodding toward the Flexibles, Roberts wrote of them as "two of his [Herter's] closest associates and supporters." He concluded that "there is little doubt that Herter shares their thinking."

Assuming that Fulbright and Nixon have a similar attitude toward dealing with Moscow, Roberts supposed that they "are strengthened in their arguments because they have the active support of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who, much more than President Eisenhower, is eager to try a 'new approach' to the Kremlin."

It well may be that the Vice President, a man of maneuver, was zigging in the interest of his Presidential candidacy and that Roberts welcomed him excessively to the Establishment. Not so Fulbright. He speaks the precise accents of the Establishment and is at the moment its most influential voice in the formation of national policy.

STATINT



The Dulles Record: An Appraisal

JAMES BURNHAM

The undiluted personal tribute to John Foster Dulles expresses a sentiment more generous than the usual hypocrisy of public life. Friend, critic and foe all feel that Dulles has fought the good fight in terms that do honor to all of us as human beings, as well as to himself; terms that have a moral validity beyond the temporal conflicts that divide men from each other. It is necessary and good that this feeling—which provokes the eternal question: What is it, then, to be a man?—should from time to time take primacy in our judgment. It will be unfortunate if it wholly supplants the effort, which is also needed, to arrive at a balanced estimate of Mr. Dulles' policies and his regime as foreign minister.

The British *Economist* has thus summarized those personal traits that controlled Mr. Dulles' conduct of his public office: "That he is a brave man and a devoted servant of his country can be said now by everybody. . . . He has the quality that every great American has had, the quality of character; and to this he has added the humdrum virtues that matter in democratic public life, tenacity, conscientiousness, and sheer hard work in his job. . . . Mr. Dulles has inspired [unqualified confidence] in President Eisenhower on account of his tenacious grasp of the most intricate problems, the exceptional range of his diplomatic knowledge and the deep moral foundations of his judgment."

Stubborn in the Right

This "tenacity" backed by "deep moral foundations" has led other commentators to call Mr. Dulles "firm," "inflexible," "stubborn," "bull-headed," and (as some critics have put it) "ossified." By those adjectives they have meant that Mr. Dulles has resisted both Soviet threats and Soviet blandishments on the one hand and the timidities of allies on the other; and that he has

been ready to go, in his own phrase, to the brink of war in order to block further Soviet advance. The refusal to recognize Red China, the actions on Quemoy and Formosa, the troop landings in Lebanon, the rigidity on the German question and the planned nuclear arming of western Europe are taken as the outstanding instances of the Dulles tenacity.

This tenacity, in concrete terms, is thus identical with what was called, under the Acheson regime, a "policy of containment." The Dulles rhetoric is different, partly because he was stuck with the 1952 campaign oratory. But in real content and in principle the Dulles policy has also been a policy of containment.

What has been distinctive about Mr. Dulles' version of containment is that he has really meant it. He has deeply believed in blocking further Soviet advance and has striven mightily to uphold his belief in practice. Communism is godless and evil; as such, Mr. Dulles has resisted it from the stern duty imposed by his Calvinist-trained conscience. Communism threatens his country and his civilization; therefore he has resisted as man of the West and patriot.

Limits of Containment

At the same time Mr. Dulles has accepted the negative implications of containment. While resisting fresh Soviet advance, containment renounces any initiative in pushing Soviet power back or attacking it from within. Mr. Dulles interpreted this negative rule strictly. Under his incumbency we have never taken even the smallest initiative. We have stood passively by, before, during and after the enemy's trouble on Stalin's death, the slave camp uprisings, the East German and Polish mass demonstrations, the Hungarian revolt, and today the revolt in Tibet. Mr. Dulles has, in fact, gone further than his Democratic predecessors in holding containment within its nega-

tive bounds. Under him the potentially "liberationist" activities (Free Europe, Free Russia and Free Asia projects, exile and underground operations, etc.) have been cut back and softened.

There is a theory and doctrine—or perhaps a rationalization—back of the policy of containment. It has been developed by conservative English writers, out of British imperial experience, and also by Trotsky and neo-Marxists. The theory holds that there is an ebb as well as flow in the sweeping tide of the great conquerors—Alexander, Attila, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Wilhelm II, Hitler, Lenin-Stalin. If we manage to hold on during the flow, the ebb will leave us intact and able again to move forward.

In sociological terms: a successful revolution, when power is consolidated and the economy begins to improve, becomes softened and bourgeoisified. The firebrand leaders are replaced by careerists who, though they may repeat the old slogans, give up the grandiose world goals for the harvest in their own garden. W. W. Rostow of MIT, ideologically very influential with both CIA and the State Department, summed up a neo-Marxian version of the process in his Kings College lectures, "Stages of Growth."

But Not Enough

Mr. Dulles believes this doctrine, though perhaps not quite in Dr. Rostow's stylized version. Unfortunately it is a false doctrine, just as the logically correlated containment policy is a losing tactic. Under Dean Acheson's loose and slippery containment the Communists took China. Under Foster Dulles' verbally inflexible containment they have broken into the Middle East and are pushing into Africa.

Our admiration for Foster Dulles as a man should not be confused with our judgment on his policy. If that policy has been stubborn it has also been sterile. It has not been marked by a single creative idea or creative achievement. The very best that we can say of that policy is that under it, though we have continued to slip, we are still clinging. Maybe, granted all conditions, that was the most that was possible. But it is not enough.